Iranium

Surely I cannot be the only one who believes that discussing Uranium enrichment with Iran is something of a ‘shutting the barn door after the horse has bolted’ exercise? Lax accounting of enriched nuclear material by the former Soviet Union has left a dangerous legacy of opportunity for would-be terrorists and non-nuclear states to join the nuclear league.

Some references which have information of relevance: http://www.bellona.no/bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/nuke-weapons/nonproliferation/24099, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1697907.stm, http://nuclearmangos.blogspot.com/2008/07/how-much-uranium.html

Even in the US which has comparatively stringent accounting of nuclear material, there are frequents accounts of the loss of radioactive material.

These are in addition to confirmed losses from former Soviet republics where the destination of the nuclear material remains unknown.

With such a valuable commodity on offer, it seems likely that unaccounted nuclear material was subsequently sold on to the highest bidder; a bidder that was cash rich, but nuclear poor. Like Iran. But radioactivity is by definition unstable. Continuous decay ensures that it doesn’t last forever; that there is a definite shelf-life. Thus it must be maintained; topped up periodically with fresh material to maintain the dosage. This would require the ability of enriching Uranium. Not massive amounts as the core stock would remain in situ. Therefore enrichment capacity to generate sufficient material to establish a nuclear weapon would not be necessary, only enough to top one up as required maintenance.

And perhaps this would explain the impetus to develop uranium enrichment capacity by Iran. After all, following the time and money invested in acquiring a seed sample for nuclear capability, it would only make sense to maintain the value and functionality of their investment.

And one could easily imagine how a bit of power could alter perspective. Perhaps this explains the hawkish posturing of the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in recent years? And perhaps the threat of nuking Israel wasn’t idle talk. Perhaps the capture of British forces in International water was a display of nuclear inspired bravado?

Either way, perhaps it is time to stop discussing Uranium enrichment with Iran with respect to developing a potential nuclear weapons programme and to start treating them as though they already possess nuclear capability? As terrifying as this prospect remains, surely dealing with a probable reality is infinitely more productive than further dalliance with delusions?